A B S T R A C T Despite the recent outbreak of violence and conflict, peace continues to be high on the agenda of the Kurdish political movement and many progressive Turkish intellectuals and activists. Based on qualitative research we conducted in Diyarbakır, Istanbul, London, and Berlin in 2015-16, we show that Kurdish activists have struggled to make the eradication of gender-based inequalities and violence central to the wider Kurdish peace movement, while Turkish women's rights activists have increasingly recognized that the war against the Kurds, "like a blanket," often papers over gender injustices. Both Kurdish and Turkish activists stress the necessity of understanding that a just and sustainable peace must include gender equality and that gender justice cannot be achieved in times of war. Thus feminist convergences in Kurdish and Turkish activism present peace and women's rights as inseparable and generate the potential to challenge nationalist state power and the militarization of society. L eyla Zana, the Kurdish member of Parliament (MP) and women's rights activist sentenced to ten years in prison in the 1990s when she spoke Kurdish while taking the parliamentary oath, repeated this act of resistance again after two decades. Her Kurdish oath at the Turkish parliament in November 2015, changing the official wording of "Turkish people" to "people of Turkey," referred to all ethnic minorities, not just the ethnically Turkish majority. But what does an honorable and permanent peace signify?
L eyla Zana, the Kurdish member of Parliament (MP) and women's rights activist sentenced to ten years in prison in the 1990s when she spoke Kurdish while taking the parliamentary oath, repeated this act of resistance again after two decades. Her Kurdish oath at the Turkish parliament in November 2015, changing the official wording of "Turkish people" to "people of Turkey," referred to all ethnic minorities, not just the ethnically Turkish majority. But what does an honorable and permanent peace signify?
Despite the outbreak of violence and conflict after July 2015, peace remains high on the agenda of the Kurdish political movement and many progressive Turkish intellectuals and activists. Feminist scholars and activists have been particularly involved in a growing movement of people demanding peace. The Women's Initiative for Peace (Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi, or BIKG) was founded in 2009 to discuss conflict, campaign for peace, and document the ways women have been affected by war and wider gender-based violence. Academics for Peace, a group with many members involved in the women's peace initiative, has made headlines after circulating a petition demanding the end of violence and the beginning of peace talks. The Turkish government's crackdown on academics who signed the petition, and the attack on academic freedom more broadly, has received international attention within media and policy circles, and opened up a space to raise awareness about the growing violence in the Kurdish region of Turkey.
Recognizing that conflict and violence require both structural and attitudinal shifts, we agree with Cilja Harders (2011) that it is constructive and useful to conceptualize the sustainability of peace in terms of transforming culture and embedding processes, rather than view it as a status or static aim. In many conflict situations it is ordinary people and activists who stop war by creating peace incrementally (Nordstrom 2004 ). Women's rights organizations have historically played an important role in campaigning for peace on a grassroots level.
In this article we argue that gender-based mobilization is central to articulations of a desire for peace, as well as to the creation of common platforms for action and more inclusive and just representation across and within ethnic communities. More specifically, our research intends to shed light on the way that peace is articulated and put into practice by actors whose conceptualization of conflict extends beyond national, ethnic, and political violence to also contain gender-based violence and conflict. We do so by looking at the specific empirical case of activists, politicians, and intellectuals working for peace in the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Through historically grounded and in-depth qualitative research among Turkish and Kurdish women and men working toward peace, we address the question of what conflict and violence means and how peace activism and gender-based activism might intersect.
The multisited qualitative research for our wider project took place between February 2015 and December 2016 in four locations: Diyarbakır, Istanbul, London, operating within specific gender norms and relations, both in their country of residence and in their country of origin (Al-Ali 2007) .
Gendering Conflict and Peace
Militarism, and more specifically the privileging of militarized masculinities and authoritarian decision making, is key to understanding the ways gendered violence permeates all aspects of society at local, national, and transnational levels (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Cockburn 1998; Enloe 1989 Enloe , 2000 Harders 2011; Mazurana and Proctor 2013; Yuval-Davis 2003) . While women tend to be the main victims of gender-based violence, men are also subject to symbolic, structural, and physical violence inherent in militarization and authoritarian politics. Crucially, women may be displaying or supporting militarized masculinities, and they might also be perpetrators of direct violence themselves (Moser and Clark 2001; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007) .
Feminist writings on violence, conflict, and peace have been instructive in moving our thinking beyond women as mere "victims of war" or "natural peacemakers" (Cockburn 1998; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005; Pankhurst 2008) . At the same time, feminist scholarship has introduced the concept of a "continuum of violence," tracing violence from peacetime to wartime and vice versa and linking acute violence during armed conflicts with sexualized and domestic violence. In this context, authors have stressed the significance of underlying structural violence, unequal access to resources, limited participation in political decision making, and discriminatory legal rights (Cockburn 2004; Mazurana and Proctor 2013) . By pointing to specific empirical examples, feminist scholars have argued that structural and symbolic violence at both individual and collective levels must be addressed to effectively tackle all forms of gender-based violence (Cockburn 2004; Harders 2011) .
In terms of peace building, it would be too simplistic to focus on the question of whether or how many women play a role in official negotiations, although that question is certainly emblematic of prevailing gender norms and power dynamics within any given context, including Turkish-Kurdish peace negotiations. We agree with Dyan Mazurana and Keith Proctor (2013) , who argue that peace building on the local level has the power to shift national outcomes. Groups and individuals promoting peace, gender equality, and justice agendas can contribute significantly to processes and cultural shifts that are essential for sustainable peace, both shortterm and long-term.
Applying these conceptual insights to the specific empirical context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and attempts at peacemaking necessitates a brief discussion of the way conflict has developed and has been understood by those campaigning for peace. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the history and contemporary dynamics of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in any detail or to address its complexities, it is important to highlight some of its origins and current dynamics. Building on this historical context, we will present the ways Kurdish and Turkish women's rights activists in particular conceptualize conflict as intersectional, before moving to an exploration of the various ways peace is understood and translated into activism.
History of Conflict in Turkey
Conflict and violence had escalated in Turkey even prior to the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, and its violent aftermath. This is despite the initial hope associated with peace negotiations and a cease-fire,which collapsed in July 2015 after two and a half years. Between 1984 and 2016 the Turkish-Kurdish conflict claimed more than fifty thousand lives. Some of our respondents put the death toll, including missing people, as high as one hundred thousand. The majority of these losses have been Kurdish. Between the general elections in Turkey on June 7 and November 1, 2015, around seven hundred deaths occurred (Amnesty International 2016; International Crisis Group 2015) . When suicide bombs exploded at a youth organization's humanitarian event in Suruç in June 2015, at a peace and democracy rally in Ankara in early autumn 2015, and at a wedding ceremony in Gaziantep in August 2016, hundreds more were killed. In November 2015 Tahir Elçi, a prominent pro-Kurdish human rights activist and lawyer and chair of the Diyarbakır Law Association, was assassinated following a speech calling for peace at a press meeting.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the wider transnational dimension of the Kurdish question, it is important to stress the significant connections between the political struggle in northern Syria and the evolving dynamics of "the Kurdish question" inside Turkey. The Turkish government's shifting policies and wave of attacks on Kurdish towns need to be understood in relation to its fear of the growing strength of the Kurdish political movement in bordering northern Syria, particularly in light of its close links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). However, in this article our focus will be on the TurkishKurdish context in relation to conflict, peace, and women's rights activism.
The history of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has been widely documented (e.g., Aslan 2015; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Bozarslan 2004; Heper 2007; Jongerden 2007; Philips 2015; Van Bruinessen 2000; Yeğen 1999 ). The root causes of what has been coined "the Kurdish question" are closely linked to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the previous year. General Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk) initially appeared to embrace Ottoman ideas of pluralism and ethnic diversity when he needed the support of Kurds to fend off the invading Greek armies during the Turkish war of independence between 1920 and 1922. Shortly after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, however, ideas of pluralism and multiculturalism were replaced with strict policies of uniformity and standardization within the overall aim of Turkification of the nation and society (Aslan 2015; Göcek 2002; Shaw and Shaw 1992; Tas 2014a ). Adopting a model of nationalism that stressed ethnocultural homogeneity, Atatürk, his successors, and the broader ideological movement of Kemalism focused on the sanctity of "Turkishness" and the centrality of Sunni Islam within the official boundaries of a secular state (Hanioğlu 2001 ). Women's social, political, and economic roles, and wider gender norms and relations, have been central to the modernizing and secularizing agenda of the Kemalist project from its inception (Müftüler-Bac 1999; Yüksel 2006) .
For Kurds, Turkification and Kemalism more broadly have meant not only forced assimilation and a denial of cultural rights and identity but also a loss of political and legal autonomy granted under the millet practice during the Ottoman Empire (Tas 2014b While our respondents had a range of views about the PKK, all agreed that the systematic and continuous repression of and state violence against Kurds contributed to the growth of the PKK and its popularity among disenfranchised Kurds, particularly young men and women. From the PKK's early days the youth of both genders perceived the party as a means to personal emancipation as much as a political movement. Our participants stressed that young Kurdish women have historically been attracted to a movement that has promised more egalitarian gender norms than is prevalent in much of the Kurdish region.
The 1990s were particularly bloody, with more than three thousand Kurdish villages forcibly evacuated and more than three million Kurds displaced. A counterinsurgency campaign involved thousands of extrajuridical killings (Bozarslan 2001; Tezcur 2013) . During this period many Kurdish women's rights activists were imprisoned and tortured alongside Kurdish men in Turkey's notorious prisons, particularly Diyarbakır Prison (Zeydanlioglu 2009) .
While the original aim of the PKK was an independent and united Kurdistan across the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, achieved through guerrilla warfare, the PKK also redefined its primary aim a few years after Öcalan's arrest in 1999. Central to the ideological shift to "democratic modernity" through legal-political struggle within the nation-state of Turkey has been an emphasis on the centrality of gender equality and rights. Gender-based equality has benefited from Öcalan's promotion of the movement in his prison writings, but it has also clearly gained power from the long-term political struggle of the Kurdish women's movement, which has challenged the male political leadership consistently over the past decades.
After Öcalan's arrest and his announcement that violence was meaningless, the PKK declared one of several cease-fires. The initial cease-fire in the early 2000s, although declared in a one-sided manner by the PKK, took hold during a period when the Turkish state was eager to show its commitment to human rights and democracy as part of its attempt to join the European Union (EU). This period also coincided with the rise of power of the "reformist" Erdoğan-led Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), which challenged the hitherto all-powerful secular Kemalist military. The AKP promised economic development and stressed the idea of "Brotherhood" based on Islam, thereby appealing to many conservative Kurds who voted for the AKP for years.
Nevertheless, throughout a period of several attempted cease-fires, no proper peace negotiations took place and no trust was established. The pro-PKK media announced the formation of the YDG-H (Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi, or Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) only a month before the last cease-fire message by Öcalan in 2013, when the official peace process between the AKP government and the PKK started, mediated by the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP). The YDG-H had grown into an armed urban militia that was tasked with digging urban trenches, building barricades, and pledging to prevent police from entering "autonomous" cities and districts in Kurdish towns in southeastern Turkey (International Crisis Group 2015, 3) . Much of the escalated urban conflict since the summer of 2015 took place between the YDG-H, now called YPS (Civil Protection Unit), whose members have tended to be between twelve and twenty-five years of age, and Turkish security forces. It is unclear how much control the PKK has exerted over the youth militia. Our respondents had varying opinions on this precarious question, with some holding the view that even if the PKK had agreed to the formation of the youth militia, it had lost the ability to control it. Others felt that this youth group could not operate and grow without the consent and support of the PKK. Whatever the exact and possibly fluid nature of the relationship between the PKK and the YPS, it is clear that Kurdish youths have played a growing role in both the conflict and possibilities for peace. Their views toward the Turkish state and society are increasingly influenced by structural forms of discrimination and stereotypical depictions of Kurds within the Turkish media (Başer and Çelik 2014) .
The 2015 elections resulted in substantial gains for the Kurdish-led progressive HDP, which thwarted Erdoğan's ambitions of an absolute majority rule and a constitutional change to allow for an executive presidency. Most Turkish feminist respondents expressed their support for this relatively new progressive party, developed out of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). The emergence of the HDP signaled a new radical strand of the broader Kurdish political and legal movement. Rather than focus on Kurdish issues exclusively, the HDP stresses the rights of all minorities in Turkey, whether based on ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexuality. The HDP's conceptualization of gender-based equality and justice also seems to diverge from and challenge the PKK's glorification of militarized masculinities that appears to extend to both male and female bodies.
Three decades of Kurdish resistance against the Turkish state has not just mobilized and politically transformed the Kurdish movement; it has also affected Turkish society. Both Turks and Kurds have raised their voices against the increasingly authoritarian and heavy-handed state. The 2013 Gezi movement, a series of protests against plans to turn Gezi Park in central Istanbul into a shopping center, became the most visible and internationally recognized articulation of this resistance. It demonstrated to young Kurds and Turks that it was possible to nonviolently take over the streets to protest the government. Despite the faltering of the Gezi movement, many intellectuals and activists in Turkey continue to protest the government's authoritarianism, as well as the state's support for ISIS and its brutal crackdown on Kurdish areas in Turkey.
In addition to feminist and LGBTQ activists, the Academics for Peace network and other professional solidarity networks modeled on the academic advocacy group have taken the lead in challenging Erdoğan's authoritarianism and the government's growing social conservatism-especially in relation to gender norms and sexuality-as well as its crackdown on Kurdish communities. However, the most recent crackdown following the failed military coup in July 2016 has led to an even more extreme politically authoritarian and socially conservative context in which dissent, critique, and support of women and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities is extremely dangerous.
Gendered Conflict
Kurdish feminist activists were central to the Kurdish political movement's growing emphasis on gender equality. One of those activists was Sakine Cansız, with whom we spoke in December 2012 during a sixty-eight-day hunger strike by about seven hundred Kurdish prisoners across Turkey. The prisoners demanded that the Kurdish language be allowed in courts and schools, and asked the Turkish government to start peace negotiations with the imprisoned Öcalan and improve his living conditions (Harte 2012) . Our interview with Cansız, only two weeks before her assassination in Paris, took place in Berlin, where she tried to mobilize the Kurdish diaspora to support the Kurdish prisoners and activists:
Our Kurdish identity and language already exist, whether the Turkish state accepts it or not. But our fight is not just against the power of the state. It is also against societal codes, which have been created by and for the state. These codes act against minority rights. They are made by men and work against the rights of women. . . . Of course, the state and men do not want to give power away easily. They force minorities and women into slave conditions. That is why I went to the mountains to fight against the state. At the same time as I am fighting for Kurdish rights, our fight is against the patriarchal structure of the state. Today we are working for peace. And peace should include the rights of different ethnic groups like Kurds, and also the rights of women. Until both of these are achieved, it is not possible to claim that we have peace. And without these, I will continue to fight, whether the state is Turkish or Kurdish.
Cansız's statement, like those of many other Kurdish women's rights activists and of men from the Kurdish political elite, points to an important dimension of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Academic and policy circles often fail to recognize that the struggle against gender-based inequalities and violence has become a core aim of the Kurdish political movement, integral to its struggle for cultural and political rights. In fact, many women's rights activists told us that conflict exists not only between the Kurdish political movement and the Turkish state but also between Kurdish women and men due to patriarchal authoritarianism. Crucially, Cansız also provides a feminist analysis of state-society relations while pointing out how state power is gendered and works through patriarchy. Ayla Akat Ata, a prominent Kurdish women's rights activist and former HDP MP, stated in an interview in Diyarbakır in September 2015: "Our male comrades are also representing the power of the state. The freedom of women has to be a priority. . . . There are four different articles in the [Turkish] constitution that we want to change. . . . We could solve the Kurdish national cause in Turkey by addressing these four articles. [But] women's rights do not depend on changing articles in the constitution." 3 Ayla Akat Ata's statement, resonating with the views of other interviewees, runs counter to the historical and cross-cultural expectation that women's rights and gender-based claims tend to be sidelined for wider political claims pertaining to national struggle. In contrast, Ata and other activists we interviewed link state power to male power, so struggling against the state also means struggling against male dominance and masculinist rule. Many interviewees stressed that they viewed the conflict with their Kurdish male comrades as more challenging than the conflict with the state. However, given subsequent developments in both the scale and the intensity of the state's crackdown on Kurdish towns and communities, as well as the Turkish government's more authoritarian demeanor, we wonder whether this view has shifted.
The perception that conflict needs to be more widely defined to include genderbased discrimination and forms of violence is shared by many Turkish women's rights activists who are involved in peace activism. A Turkish feminist lawyer who has worked on issues of domestic violence within Turkey, as well as solidarity activism with the Kurdish political movement, stated in Istanbul in October 2015:
Every year hundreds of Turkish and Kurdish women are killed in Turkey. And this is only the official number. We have many more unofficial violent killings against women, and we don't know how many women feel forced to commit suicide. Violence against women in society and violence in war are directly connected to each other. War is like a blanket to cover all other forms of violence, especially against women. Women should fight for peace, because without actual peace we cannot even talk, we cannot resolve gender-based inequalities, we cannot stop violence against women. Laws become meaningless during acute conflict. As a group of lawyers, we are dealing with at least thirty cases of violence against women in twenty cities in Turkey. If the times were peaceful, we could have pushed policy makers to follow the law. We could try to lobby the media to focus more on gender-based violence. But we are unable to do so right now, because the war continues between Turks and Kurds, and gender-based violence is perceived to be a minor detail by the media.
Here the emphasis is clearly different in that ethnic-political conflict is seen to hinder the struggle against gender-based violence. Aside from state violence, societal gender-based violence, including honor-based killings, is also a fact in the Kurdish regions. One study based in the Kurdish city of Urfa found that, according to official data collected between 1974 and 2005, 181 women were killed by their families (Belge 2008) . Between 2009 and 2011 more than two hundred honorbased killings were carried out annually in Turkey (Corbin 2014; Navai 2011) . Our respondents told us that the actual numbers are much higher than the official statistics. Moreover, as several Kurdish and Turkish activists stressed, honor-based killings and wider gender-based violence in Kurdish society have historically been represented by the Turkish state and Turkish feminists as consequences of tribal culture, enabling the positioning of the state and military as modernizers and liberators who need to intervene. Recently, the same feminist lawyer quoted above stated that as conflict and violence in Kurdish regions in Turkey has escalated, gender-based violence, including the murder of women, has risen in Turkey.
We found that many respondents in the diaspora also conceptualized conflict and violence in not only ethnic and political but also gendered terms. A Turkish long-term feminist activist from Berlin, involved in the Kurdish political movement and active in the HDP, argued in November 2015 that women make up 50 percent of society. But in every society, even in Germany, we have witnessed violence and forms of inequality against women. It is a global disease. Even "modern states" have not managed to end this issue. In the context of the TurkishKurdish conflict, we have also witnessed that. With the effect of ethnic and religious conflict or civil war, violence against women increases. Women, mothers from all sides, should come together to make peace. If we come together, if we refuse to send our sons and daughters to war for a political aim, then we can end both forms of violence together.
Her articulation of the relationship between ethnic conflict, gender-based violence, and peace parallels that of the lawyer mentioned earlier. However, her diasporic positionality expands her intersectional analysis and politics by challenging the idea that gender-based violence is inherent in Kurdish, Turkish, or Muslim societies but not in Western countries such as Germany.
Radicalization of Youth
The breakdown of the formal peace process between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement, along with the Kurdish uprising in Rojava, northern Syria, has strengthened the Kurdish youth movement. Several respondents stressed that young Kurdish women and men have become fearless as a result of their experiences during the 1990s, a period of prolonged acute conflict, widespread violence, and large-scale displacement. The next generation of Kurdish activists, who have grown up in war, may well be more radical than older generations. A young Kurdish militant explained to the online newspaper Al-Monitor (Gurcan 2015):
We didn't have a defense force to protect our people in cities. As YDG-H [now YPS], we filled that void. The youth is more organized and aware now. We started by taking an oath to protect the Kurdish people against the state's oppression. In the old days, our youth was afraid of the state and ran away. Today, hundreds of youth push aside the barbed wire in front of soldiers and join the Kobani resistance. These are all benefits of our getting organized. Let everyone know that we have answers to everything the state can come up with.
Our respondents' views were initially divided over the Kurdish youth movement's strategy to build trenches in majority Kurdish towns in order to resist police violence and defend self-governance and democratic autonomy. A series of brutal and prolonged police-enforced curfews have involved the heavy use of tear gas, random and targeted shootings, and shelling of buildings. Authorities have also prevented targeted Kurdish towns from receiving medical and humanitarian aid. These attacks appear to have swayed the majority of people we interviewed to focus their attention and critique against the Turkish state.
Yet Nebahat Akkoç, a prominent Kurdish women's rights activist and founder of KA-MER, an active women's rights organization based in Diyarbakır with many branches throughout Turkey (Arat and Altinay 2015) , expressed a different view in an interview with Bianet, an online platform closely linked to Academics for Peace. In her view, the tactic used by the Kurdish youth movement was not helping create democratic autonomy and self-governance but only justifying state violence. According to Akkoç, several civil society associations in Diyarbakır are adopting the slogan "We don't want trenches and we don't want state curfews!" (Tahaoğlu 2016 ). In the interview she, like many respondents, also stressed the parallel trends of escalating violence on the streets and at home.
While the tactics of the Kurdish youth movement, as well as its exact relationship to the PKK, are up for discussion, it is obvious that this militarized form of resistance -as opposed to that of the political-legal strand of the Kurdish political movement-privileges militarized masculinities, even if young women participate in the movement as well. It is too early to assess whether the Kurdish political movement's emphasis on gender-based justice and equality will mitigate the greater militarization of society, which, according to feminist scholarship in different historical and cultural contexts, tends to promote authoritarianism, strengthen patriarchal gender norms, and intensify gender-based violence. It is also clear that any future peace negotiations and processes will have to involve the Kurdish youth movement. Meanwhile, locally as well as nationally, Kurdish and Turkish women's rights activists of different generations have taken the lead in championing the "permanent and honorable peace" demanded by Leyla Zana.
What Kind of Peace?
At the end of February 2015 the Dolmabahçe Agreement, a joint statement about "peace talks," was issued by the progressive Kurdish-led HDP and representatives of the AKP government. Subsequently, many people in Turkey and across the Kurdish diaspora were hopeful that concrete steps would be taken toward peace and the development of a more democratic society. However, after only one month Erdoğan publicly distanced himself from any peace process. His stance appeared to be a ploy to win the Turkish nationalist vote in the June 2015 parliamentary elections (Cengiz 2015) .
While the official peace process ground to a halt, replaced with an increasingly violent conflict and -since the failed coup attempt in July 2016-a widening crackdown on any form of dissent, Turkish and Kurdish women's rights activists and academics have been at the forefront of joint grassroots initiatives for peace. Several of our Turkish and Kurdish respondents are members of the Women's Initiative for Peace, a group established in reaction to the 2009 arrest of Kurdish women activists who had fought for peace. Members of the group come from a spectrum of political positions; ethnic, social, and religious backgrounds; and sexual orientations. The group has mobilized women's and LGBTQ organizations across the country to campaign for peace and raise awareness about the connection between the state and gender-based violence. Their activities include conferences and workshops, protests, sit-ins, and other creative forms of nonviolent direct action.
A report published by the Women's Initiative for Peace in 2013 not only invited the government to create a national plan that would ensure equal participation of women in peace-building processes but also asked for greater transparency and mechanisms that would allow peace-building processes within society to be part of a national action plan (BIKG 2013) . However, at the time, the government engaged only in limited steps to create "the myth of democratic peace" (Layne 1994) . One of the government's few concrete steps was the formation on April 3, 2013, of a "Wise Men's Committee," whose members were selected by then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. There was initial criticism of the commission's name, "Wise Men," which was then changed to "Wise People's Committee." Accusations of sexism continued after the announcement of its members revealed that it included fifty-one men and only twelve women (Gursel 2013) . The ethnic makeup also did not seem well designed for an end to more than thirty years of war: only six out of the sixtythree members had any connection with Kurdish ethnicity or politics.
Several respondents commented on the need for more equal representation between men and women in order to achieve success and a sustainable peace. One respondent said that "the so-called 'Wise People' were a propaganda team for the government." The need for equal representation was stressed particularly by Kurdish women's rights activists involved in the Kurdish women's movement's struggle to increase female representation within the Kurdish political and legal movement.
Based on Al-Ali's (2007) and Al-Ali and Pratt's (2009) work in Iraq on genderbased quotas, we were initially skeptical of the idea of women and men cochairing in leadership positions as advocated and practiced by the Kurdish political movement in Turkey as well as in Rojava. The comayor of Diyarbakır, Gültan Kışanak, a veteran women's rights activist and former MP of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), explained to us in September 2015 that a cochair system had been pushed by Kurdish women's rights activists linked to the PKK as part of the attempt to create a more just political system (Kışanak, Al-Ali, and Tas 2016) . Despite our skepticism, we saw evidence that women's political participation as MPs and as cochairs was more than an "add women and stir approach." It also became obvious that cochairing is not an end in itself but part of a broader political process. Gültan Kışanak reminded us of the internal struggle to create a gender-balanced system of cochairing:
We started co-chairing in 2004, although at the time this was not legal. But the women were all pressured by their male co-chairs. They were perceived as assistants. After 2007, women became more visible and powerful. The 2007 elections were revolutionary for both Kurdish and Turkish women. 8 out of 26 Kurdish MPs were women.
Women became more confident as co-chairs and men had to accept them as equals.
Other political parties were embarrassed and started to introduce a co-chair system as well. But it was not simply a matter of a quota and co-chairing, but the actual style and work of parliament changed. Women did not ask for permission any more to speak on important subjects such as the defence budget. 4 Kışanak, like other Kurdish activists, emphasized that the shift toward a more equitable and representative political system of cochairing between male and female leaders-which also took into consideration diversity in terms of generation and ethnicity-was not merely a cosmetic exercise but part of a radical attempt to transform the political culture of the Kurdish political movement and to make genderbased justice central to its wider political claims. All respondents also stressed that they perceived their commitment to gender-based justice as a condition for sustainable peace.
Meanwhile, the Turkish feminists we interviewed stressed that they learned a lot from their Kurdish counterparts. One of the Turkish founding members of the Women for Peace Initiative, who is also involved in Academics for Peace, said in a public talk in Istanbul in September 2015:
I would like to propose that we should redefine the word "peace. Here we see a crucial expansion of the feminist conceptualization of peace frequently articulated as an end to all forms of physical, structural, and symbolic violence to include the act of listening and being open to hearing the voices and views of others. The speaker's conceptualization profoundly humanizes the processes linked to peacemaking.
The recognition that Kurdish women's rights activists have paved the way for more radical feminist politics was widespread among several Turkish feminists with whom we spoke. Yet only a decade ago, as many respondents stressed, Turkish and Kurdish feminist organizations were deeply divided along ethnic and political lines, with limited cooperation around gender-based violence. Despite the critique of Kemalism as patriarchal and authoritarian by the more radical and autonomous Turkish feminist organizations that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, the specific plights of and challenges for Kurdish women's rights activists were largely ignored or dismissed by third-wave Turkish feminists (Çaha 2011; Diner and Toktas 2010; Yüksel 2006) . The limitations of the Turkish feminist movement became obvious in relation to Islamic feminists' critique of the authoritarian secular character of the movement but, as many respondents argued, it was Kurdish feminists who pointed to its ethnocentric "Turkishness."
In recent years, however, Turkish feminists not only have become much more critical of the modernizing nationalist trends central to Kemalist women's rights activism but also have started to take the specific plights and concerns of Kurdish women's rights activists more seriously. This change in attitude and politics has resulted from many factors, including the consistent work of Kurdish women's rights activists over the past decades, which has been noticed and increasingly respected by Turkish feminists of all generations. Another important factor has been the emergence of a new generation of feminists in Turkey who are critical of the Turkish women's movement's Kemalist past, Turkish nationalism, and authoritarianism. This generation is influenced by transnational feminist politics and solidarities and engages in intersectional feminist politics (Arat and Altinay 2015; Çaha 2011; Diner and Toktas 2010; Yüksel 2006) .
In January 2016 the Women's Initiative for Peace spearheaded a campaign, involving a petition, regular vigils, and solidarity events, supported by 165 feminist and LGTBQ organizations across Turkey.
5 Stressing the right to safety and protection, the petition and the wider campaign shift focus from the debate on whether violence on "both sides" should be condemned, or whether the focus should be on state violence. As part of their campaign, the Women's Initiative for Peace issued a statement in February 2016 titled "We Are on the Side of Life, Not Death! We Defend Our Right to Peace and Truth," which describes the scale of the conflict and suffering of the Kurdish population in the besieged towns under attack. It also outlines the activities of the coalition of women's groups. The leaflet states:
On 31 January we met as "1000 Women for Peace" in a square in Istanbul despite police pressure to end our protest. We gathered hundreds of messages for peace on our website. On 6 February we embarked upon a journey to Diyarbakır-the center of the Kurdish area, of which the Sur neighborhood is under heavy siege-in order to demonstrate our solidarity as women against this war and these sieges. Dozens of buses, full of more than 600 women from cities across Turkey-Istanbul, Bursa, Rize, Ankara, Despite this strong commitment in support of peace and risk taking on behalf of the majority of the women we interviewed, it became clear that the conceptualization and meaning of peace varies among our respondents, even among members of the Women's Initiative for Peace. One feminist activist who is also a member of the group Academics for Peace, and had lost her job after signing the academic petition, told us: "The word peace is somehow becoming an empty signifier. You organize a peace rally, and then people display posters of Öcalan. It is a contradictory position. You revere a military leader. So are you for armed struggle, or are you for peace?" It was evident that within the Women's Initiative for Peace, there exists a continuum of positions along pacifist lines, the commitment to nonviolent struggle, and the right to defend through armed struggle. It would be too simplistic to attach specific political positions to ethnicity, as there were a range of views among both Kurdish and Turkish activists. However, the centrality of freedom for Öcalan is a particular aspect of the Kurdish political movement, including Kurdish women's rights activism.
Interestingly, a few months later, when the conflict and violence had escalated drastically, the same activist quoted above stressed in a follow-up interview that she had lost her reservations about the way the Kurdish political movement approaches and conceptualizes peace. "State power and oppression have consolidated my position and my commitment to peace," she noted. As violence in Kurdish regions in Turkey escalated, the views of Turkish and Kurdish feminist academics and activists increasingly mirrored each other. The state's growing authoritarianism and brutal repression of Kurdish communities resulted in a shift in conceptualization of peace among many Turkish feminist activists who initially might have expressed discomfort about the Kurdish political movement's complex relationship to the PKK and Öcalan.
Yet not everyone we talked to felt committed to the idea of peace in whichever form it was expressed or conceptualized. As Tas (2016b) has shown in greater detail, many Kurds in the diaspora do not trust the Turkish state, especially the current Erdoğan-led government, to make peace. A former Kurdish fighter who spent decades of her life devoted to armed struggle before moving to Berlin stated in November 2015:
I don't think a centralized hegemonic state like Turkey wants peace with Kurds. If they do want it, they need first to prove it by releasing our leader, Öcalan, and all our other prisoners. Öcalan has been in a Turkish prison for seventeen years and so, in his name, all Kurds have been imprisoned. Instead of doing this, they just make more demands when they ask the PKK to give up their arms and surrender. There is no equality, and
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Kurdish and Turkish Women's Rights Activism there can't be an equal peace or process if one side is forced to drop their arms, and their leader-who is a main actor within the peace process-is still kept in prison. . . . The Turkish public simply follows their leader's nationalist slogans. The PKK should not give up any arms until a definite peace has been made, under international guarantees.
If they don't defend their public with their guns and create an equal space for Kurds, I and many other Kurdish people won't forgive the PKK for any crimes against Kurds in the present and future. We can only make a strong and equal peace with the existence of a strong, armed force.
The Kurdish diaspora, just like other conflict-generated diasporas, tends to be more radical and nationalist than many Kurdish regions in Turkey. Although views among Kurdish and Turkish women and men are not homogeneous and reflect different personal and political experiences, migration trajectories, and socioeconomic and gendered positions, the failure to recognize the significance of diaspora mobilization, activism, and influence on political developments inside Turkey will be detrimental to the prospect of more sustainable peace.
Although we detected a range of positions and conceptualizations of peace both in the diaspora and inside Turkey, it was evident that Kurdish peace activists have come to see gender-based equality as central to their struggle. At the same time, Turkish women's rights activists increasingly realize that there cannot be a struggle for women's rights while there are constant violence and war.
Conclusion
In the context of a failed official peace process and escalating violence, the Women's Initiative for Peace and other Turkish and Kurdish activists have been instrumental in creating spaces for dialogue, raising awareness about the scale and impact of conflict, and making the connection between the violence linked to the TurkishKurdish conflict and different forms of gender-based violence. Formal cessation of armed conflict, that is, state-sponsored peace, can and does regularly take place without including women or considering broader gender norms and relations. As feminist scholars point out (Cockburn 2004; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, and Strand 2014) , studies on war and peace often reproduce the gender gap prevalent in policy discourses and practices. However, in line with recent feminist scholarship, we argue that transforming violence, tackling root causes of conflict, and achieving sustainable peace is impossible without a gendered lens and approach. Moreover, our article illustrates that feminism and a concern for gender-based equality enables Kurdish and Turkish women (and some men) to cross the ethnic-national-and maybe even class-based and regional-boundaries that separate them and to challenge militarism and authoritarianism.
To achieve sustainable peace, it is more productive to conceptualize conflict not as an event but as a set of interlinked processes and power configurations relevant to any given historical and empirical context. In the context of Turkey, as well as in relation to many other conflicts in the world, the transformation of conservative gender norms and relations is central to challenging the underlying structural inequalities fueling conflict and, in the long term, creating harmony between and within communities. Our article highlights the need to widen conceptualizations of conflict to view it not as an isolated event but as a site where masculinist militarism, patriarchy, and authoritarianism converge.
Turkish and Kurdish feminist peace activists stress the intersections between the processes of making peace with the state and across ethnic groups, on the one hand, and creating peace between men and women, on the other. A gendered analysis forces us to expand our conceptualization of the underlying conflict, or rather conflicts. As our respondents forcefully argue, conflict not only is linked to the state -that is, state-based violence-but also concerns men and genderbased violence. In this context Turkish and Kurdish feminist activists not only push boundaries pertaining to ethnic and political divisions but also force a feminist analysis that looks beyond a continuum of violence to consider intersecting and mutually constitutive forms of violence and conflict.
Moreover, we need to stress the tensions and contradictions apparent in our respondents' views and practices around the role of the state. On the level of everyday political practices and, one might add, pragmatism, much of the activism and campaigning is state-centric. The Kurdish women's rights activists we interviewed often focused on the Turkish state, that is, on stopping state violence, changing articles in the constitution, and recognizing Kurdish political parties. However, on the level of ideology and political vision, there is clearly a perception, in line with the prison writings of Abdullah Öcalan, that the state as we know it is part of the problem and key in reproducing patriarchal structures. The long-term political vision is to achieve peace in a context where the state and its current authoritarian and patriarchal structures are replaced by a more localized horizontal and egalitarian political entity in line with the ideas about democratic confederalism put into practice in northern Syria (Rojava). At the same time, some activists appear to recognize that the Kurdish issue in Turkey could be addressed by changing several articles of the constitution, while gender inequalities require a much broader political and social transformation.
Most of our respondents were genuinely committed to a radically inclusive, pluralist democracy with gender-based equality at its heart. Several Kurdish women's rights activists emphasized the shift away from nationalist discourse, stating that "nationalism is bad for women: whether Turkish or Kurdish nationalism." In a historical and cross-cultural perspective, a view in which women's rights and gender-based equality are not seen as secondary to the wider political struggle is unique. Feminist scholars have documented in many contexts in the Middle East, but also cross-culturally, how gender-based claims are systematically sidelined in favor of wider political struggles for independence, rights, justice, and so-called equality. Our respondents, on the other hand, were consistent in stressing the centrality of gender-based equality and justice in the struggle against authoritarianism. Despite our participants' appreciation of Öcalan's support of gender-based equality, Kurdish women activists stress that what rights they have were not won easily, and this struggle continues. It is also important to emphasize that the women we interviewed do not represent the broad spectrum of political positions existent among the Kurdish population in Turkey, which include nationalist, Islamist, and liberal views. We should recognize, too, that a growing urban Kurdish middle class is invested differently in conflict and peace, perhaps motivated less by political principles of egalitarianism than by considerations linked to economic conditions and access to resources.
It is too early to assess how the commitment of gender-based equality and justice will be impacted by the increased militarization of Kurdish and Turkish society due to the escalation of conflict, the growing significance of the militant Kurdish youth movement in Turkey, and the Kurdish military resistance to ISIS in northern Syria. We anticipate that if the killing of Kurdish civilians and youth militants-with retaliation against the Turkish army and police-continues without a proper peace process, more radical Kurdish constituencies may eclipse the PKK within Turkey. In this context the question is how long the Kurdish political leadership can convince the more radicalized youth that nonviolent and nonnationalist struggle rooted in gender-based equality and justice is the way forward. It also remains to be seen how an agenda based on gender equality will find sustained support in an environment of growing conservatism, attacks on feminism, and increasing authoritarianism in Erdoğan-ruled Turkey. 
